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ABSTRACT Many users are not aware of the potential privacy implications of ubiquitous multimedia 
applications.  Decision-makers are often reluctant to raise users’ awareness, since this may open a “can of 
worms” and deter potential users.  We conducted an opportunistic study after videoconferencing developers 
placed a camera in the common room of their university department, broadcasting the video on the Internet. The 
email debate following the common room users “discovery” of the camera’s existence was analyzed as well as 
47 anonymous questionnaire responses.  Three distinct types of responses were identified, varying with the 
media type (audio vs. video) transmitted and scope of distribution (local vs. global).  The groups also differ in 
their perception of the common room situation (public vs. private) and the degree of control exerted by observers 
and those observed.  We conclude that privacy implications of ubiquitous multimedia applications must be made 
explicit.  Users who discover privacy implication retrospectively are likely to respond in an emotive manner, 
reject the technology, and lose trust in those responsible for it. 
 




With the rapid advance of network and compression 
technology, ubiquitous multimedia is fast becoming a 
reality (Crowcroft et al., in press).  Applications of 
this technology include broadcasting of multimedia 
data on a global scale (e.g. putting lectures and 
seminars on the Internet) and continuous recording of 
such data (e.g. video diaries).  Remote access is an 
inherent feature of ubiquitous multimedia 
applications: data captured locally by microphones, 
cameras and sensors can be accessed through the 
network.  Many users will welcome the chance to 
remotely check their windows at home if a storm 
breaks while they are at work, or to survey the 
contents of their fridge before going to the 
supermarket on their way home. The same users 
would not, however, allow anybody to view live 
video from their home, or to monitor their food 
preferences, since such data are regarded as private.  
Clearly, the increase in multimedia data, and 
functionality for accessing and using them, carries 
risks for users as well as benefits (Bellotti, 1997; 
Neumann, 1995; Smith, 1993).  
Privacy is a basic human requirement.  The U.S. 
supreme court ruled that privacy is a more 
fundamental right than any of those stated in the Bill 
of Rights (Schoeman, 1992). Providing adequate 
protection of people’s privacy is complicated by the 
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phenomenon’s socio-psychological nature – what is 
regarded as private varies across individuals, 
organizations and cultures. This is especially true in 
ubiquitous multimedia environments, which can 
involve many individuals, domains and cultures.  
There is, therefore, an obvious need for a HCI model 
of salient factors, which allow prediction of 
perceived privacy invasions.  The main problem with 
establishing such a model in is that privacy factors 
vary according to users’ perceptions, which are 
manipulated by an array of personal trade-offs 
(Davies, 1997).  It is, therefore, necessary to consider 
social norms that guide our interactions, and how 
ubiquitous multimedia environments distort these 
norms and relevant privacy factors.  
1.2 Social Norms  
There is evidence that users equate computer-
mediated interaction with interaction in the real 
world.  Users' perception of social factors, such as 
privacy, is, therefore, vital to the successful and 
effective introduction of technology.  Social norms 
(such as politeness and decency) guide social 
interactions and determine socially rich responses - 
irrespective of whether a system was designed to 
cater for them (Laurel, 1993; Reeves & Nass, 1996).   
Based on existing knowledge, users construct social 
representations that allow them to recognize and 
contextualize social stimuli.  These representations 
originate from social interaction and help us 
construct an understanding of the social world, 
enabling interaction between groups sharing the 
representations (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995).  
Social situations provide cues that allow people to 
make assessments of those situations.  Harrison & 
Dourish (1996) argue that it is a sense of place that 
guides social interactions and our perceptions of 
privacy, rather than the physical characteristics of a 
space.  This is because social norms guide our 
perceptions of spaces allowing us to interpret them as 
places and adapt our behaviors accordingly.  All 
parties within the same culture understand what is - 
and is not - acceptable in a given situation (i.e. it is 
acceptable to stare at a street performer but not at a 
passer-by). However, our perception of a situation 
also depends on how we see ourselves in that 
situation.  Goffman (1969) pointed out that, when an 
individual takes part in an interaction, there is an 
intentional and unknowing perception of being 
involved in the situation. The presentation of the self 
within a perceived situation increases the risks 
attached with potential consequences extending from 
the personal to the social level.  If an individual’s 
perception of a situation turns out to be incorrect 
after the event, there are far-reaching consequences.  
Previously natural interactions suddenly seem 
inappropriate, making individuals feel awkward and 
flustered. The perception of the self and others is also 
likely to change. Ultimately, how we perceive 
ourselves depends on assumptions made about a 
situation that are based on social norms.  If these 
assumptions are vastly inaccurate, there will be far-
reaching repercussions.  
1.3 Ubiquitous Multimedia Technology 
Cowan (1983) argues that invasion of privacy is 
merely a by-product of the information society. 
Technology increases potential invasions of privacy 
because of the perceived control of certain 
applications.  Karabenick & Knapp (1988) studied 
students who failed to identify concepts in a task, and 
were allowed to seek help from a computer or 
another person.  The proportion of those seeking help 
from the computer was significantly greater than 
those turning to a person.  Since a computer does not 
make psychological judgements about abilities, 
users’ felt in control of the situation and trusted in the 
technology.  Surveillance technology, on the other 
hand, has been used to curtail our freedom in a way 
so as to control and manipulate socially unacceptable 
behavior.  Jeremy Bentham (1832) argued for control 
by surveillance, in the preface to his Panopticon, 
whereby every person in a building is watched from a 
central tower.  Although people are not watched all 
the time, they maintain their standards of behavior 
for fear of being watched.  Fear is maintained by 
examples being made of odd individuals, “to keep the 
others on their toes”.  The Panopticon’s modern-day 
equivalent, closed-circuit television (CCTV), is one 
of the fastest growing technologies.  In the UK, for 
instance, coverage is such that there will soon be a 
national CCTV network.  Although CCTV provides 
little or no means of control by those being observed 
many users accept the potential risks to their privacy 
(e.g. security staff using CCTV footage for their 
entertainment or profit) in a trade-off with perceived 
benefit (e.g. preventing crime).  Such trade-offs are 
usually made within an environment where the 
perceived individual risks are low (I am doing 
nothing wrong, so I am OK) and/or the perceived 
benefits (e.g. personal safety) are high.   If such a risk 
assessment (based on social cues) turns out to be 
inaccurate, the implications for privacy are far-
reaching. 
People need social cues about the type of situation 
in which they find themselves (e.g. public/private), 
and the types of appropriate behaviour with which 
they should respond (Goffman, 1969).  We also use 
social cues to assess who we are interacting with and 
how we think others perceive us.  Multimedia 
environments vary in the level of contextual cues 
provided that enable users to appropriately frame 
their interactive behavior (Harrison & Dourish, 
1996).  Privacy problems often occur when people 
who are observed cannot see how they are being 
viewed, by whom (the information receiver), and for 
what purpose (Bellotti, 1997; Lee et al, 1997). Users 
may make assumptions about the information 
receiver (IR) viewing a picture of a certain size or 
quality, but technology may allow the receiver to 
configure and manipulate the image they receive.  
Interpersonal distance has, in the past, been found to 
dictate the intensity of a response: faces in a close-up 
are scrutinised more often than those in the 
background.  Reeves & Nass (1996) argue that, 
because the size of a face is more than just a 
representation of an individual, it can influence 
psychological judgements of a person and thus 
become an invasive piece of information.  Image 
quality and camera angles may result in a perception 
of the viewee by the viewer that the viewee regards 
as inaccurate.  Users’ assumptions about the IR can 
similarly be distorted by the technology.  A system 
allowing the viewer to freeze the video (e.g. so that 
they appear to be avidly watching the screen, when 
they have actually gone to make themselves a cup of 
tea) could produce an inaccurate appraisal of their 
attention within the interaction.  Another privacy 
issue associated with the IR is the viewee’s 
assumption that there is only one viewer, when the 
information is actually accessible to many others.  It 
has been argued that - if a system is embedded in the 
organisational culture - social controls will establish 
a culture of use which will restrict these activities 
(Dourish, 1993).  Relying merely on social controls 
for safeguarding privacy is dangerous if assumptions 
based on social cues are distorted by the technology 
itself.  The aim of the study reported here was to 
identify users’ perceptions of ubiquitous multimedia, 
and its relationship to privacy factors.  A specific 
model of the factors guiding users in their privacy 
assessments will then be developed. 
1.4 Privacy Factors  
To define privacy adequately, it is important 
to identify privacy boundaries which, if breached, are 
likely to cause resentment among users.  If such 
boundaries can be identified and mapped, appropriate 
organizational behavior and security mechanisms 
could be formulated and integrated into 
organizational policy (Smith, 1993). Previous 
research has identified three main privacy factors: 
information sensitivity, information receiver, and 
information usage: 
Information Sensitivity: Previous work on users’ 
perception of authentication mechanisms (Adams et 
al., 1997; Adams & Sasse, in press) identified the 
concept of information sensitivity: users rate certain 
types of information as sensitive or private.  This 
perception determines the amount of effort that users 
are prepared to expend on protecting that 
information.  Discussions of privacy often ignore that 
the same information may be rated – and therefore 
treated - differently by different users.  Another 
common misconception is that users make a simple 
binary private/not private distinction: users actually 
describe information sensitivity as a dimension with 
varying degrees of sensitivity.    
Information Receiver (IR): Users’ privacy can be 
invaded without them being aware of it (Bellotti, 
1997).  This leads to a further important distinction: 
whether it is what is known about a person that is 
invasive, or who knows it.  To date, research on 
privacy has not clearly identified the role of the IR – 
who receives information that is rated as sensitive by 
a user.  Users’ perception of being vulnerable to - 
and trusting - the IR can enable or restrict self-
expression and personal development within 
multimedia communications.  Certain technology 
may apply well in an environment of trust but fail in 
an atmosphere of distrust (Harrison & Dourish, 1996; 
Bellotti, 1997). 
Information Usage: Information about users can 
promote concerns about how and for what purposes it 
is used. (Dix, 1990).  At the same time, privacy 
concerns can be reduced through trust, i.e. in an 
environment that have an ‘acceptable use’ policy for 
potentially invasive applications and/or data (Bellotti 
& Sellen, 1993).  It has been suggested that a lack of 
contextual elements in processing and use may be a 
key factor in potential invasions of privacy (Dix, 
1990).  These concerns can be addressed by 
providing users with mechanisms for control and 
feedback (Bellotti & Sellen, 1993).  Such 
mechanisms, though, do not necessarily cover 
information which users initially perceived as 
innocuous but is potentially invasive when viewed 
out of context. 
Finally, it must be identified whether users trade off 
perceived privacy risks against benefits (see section 
1.3).  
2. THE STUDY 
2.1 Situation 
Two videoconferencing developers (not the 
authors) placed a small camera in the staff common 
room of their university department.  Their 
immediate colleagues knew about the camera, but the 
general staff of the department were not consulted.  
The camera captured a limited view of the common 
room, including the entrance, pigeonholes and some 
of the seating area.  The camera view was transmitted 
over the multicast backbone of the Internet1 and thus 
could be viewed potentially by thousands of users 
anywhere in the world.   The developers placed a 
notice explaining the purpose of the camera on the 
common room door.  However, most common room 
users did not read the notice because the door was 
always open, obscuring the notice. 
The purpose of the camera – to contribute to an 
existing “Places around the World” multicast 
session – was also announced in a casual message to 
a small email list of multicast tool developers.   A 
week later, an email message about the availability of 
images from the common room was sent to a larger 
multimedia research list, and finally to the 
departmental mailing list.  Three reasons were cited 
for placing the camera: 
1.  “We can see from our desks what’s going on 
in the common room, and decide whether to go 
there.” 
2. “To stop people taking coffee from other 
people’s pigeonholes” (followed by a “;-)” 
smilie). 
3. “This helps us gain experience with 
telepresence.” 
An email debate ensued, in which several 
departmental members stated they were unhappy 
about the camera being in the common room.  It was 
then suggested that the camera would be more 
beneficial in the photocopier room to check the 
accessibility of the copier.  After a day’s debate, the 
camera was moved to the photocopier room.  Placed 
behind the copier, it transmitted a close-up view (at 
hip level) of photocopier users.  There was a 
prominent notice on the photocopier room door and 
an announcement on the multimedia research list. 
The email debate continued, and further objections 
were raised, until the camera was finally removed. 
The authors decided to seize the opportunity and 
distributed a 2-page anonymous2 paper 
questionnaire, with both closed and open-ended 
questions3, to all departmental members.  The 
questionnaire asked how comfortable repondents 
were about:  
(a) audio and visual transmission  
(b) the situation (common vs. photocopier room) 
(c) for different levels of transmission (department 
vs. university vs. world),  
                                                          
1 See Macedonia & Brutzmann (1994) for an 
introduction to multicast conferencing technology 
and its applications. 
2 We did not ask for information which could potentially be 
used to identify respondents (e.g. multimedia expertise, 
gender).  
3 These sections allowed respondents to ‘let off steam’ - 
several pages were filled out by some respondents, 
providing a rich source of qualitative data. 
(d) the re-use of the information within a different 
context.   
Grounded theory methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) 
were used to analyse the questionnaire responses and 
all relevant email messages.  
2.2 Results 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used to analyze 
47 questionnaire responses.  The majority of 
respondents agreed on two points: 
 
1. They were significantly less comfortable with 
audio rather than video data being transmitted - 
both generally and in the specific situation of the 
common room.  
2. They were significantly less comfortable with 
the re-use of (recorded) video data as opposed to 
continuous transmission (see Table 1). 
 















P < 0.005 
 
Table 1: Significant findings for all respondents 
(*specific situation of the common room) 
 
In a cluster analysis, 3 groups with significantly 
different perception profiles emerged (see Table 2 
and Diagram 1).  
 
 Grp 1 Grp 2 Grp 3 
Group size 15 14 13 
Significance levels 
Visual transmission 
General /  Specific 
.029* .655 .053 
General 
Visual / Audio 
.005* .000* .000* 
Specific 
Visual / Audio 
.055 .000 * .000* 
CS / UCL .189 .047* 1.000 
CS / World DIS .096 .028* .721 
 
Table 2: Clustered groups comfort levels  (*P<0.05) 
 
Further qualitative analysis provided distinct 
profiles of each group (see Table 3 & 4). The 
qualitative issues were categorized according to the 3 
privacy factors previously highlighted (see section 
1.4).  A clear difference was identified between 




























Group3 Group2 Group1 
 




 Grp 1 Grp 2 Grp 3 
Information Receiver    
Observed Control 9 5 0 
Observer Control 0 0 7 
Information Sensitivity    
CR Private Situation 3 4 1 
CR Public Situation 0 0 4 
Information Usage    
Benefits 0 6 7 
Costs 14 8 0 
 
Table 3:  Sample of qualitative analysis by groups 
 
Since questionnaire responses were collected 
anonymously, we were not able to identify Group 3 
members.  However, analysis of the email debate 
indicates that many of the respondents who placed 
the camera in the common room (multicast tool 
developers) exhibited Group 3 profiles (discussed in 
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Control 
“… how to become one 















“only for nosy 
computer scientists 
wishing to assess the 






Table 4: Sample of coded comments 
 
The degree of invasiveness of the video was also 
identified as related to the quality and focus of the 








3.1 Privacy model validated  
One pivotal finding of this study is the impact that 
users’ perception of information sensitivity has on 
their assessment of privacy invasions.  All users were 
significantly less comfortable with audio – rather 
than visual data - being transmitted.  Users perceive 
what they say to be potentially more sensitive than 
what they do - in general, and in the specific case of 
this study (where video only was transmitted).  All 
respondents also expressed strong discomfort if the 
video data transmitted were to be recorded and re-
used (information usage) out of context (Dix, 1990).  
This highlights the flexible nature of information 
sensitivity - data initially considered to be non-
invasive may be perceived as invasive when used out 
of context.  Contrary to our expectations, the 
majority of respondents did not perceive the 
information receiver as an important factor effecting 
information sensitivity - except for Group 2, who was 
significantly more uncomfortable with distribution of 
the visual data beyond the department.  Ultimately, 
the two groups that did not perceive the information 
receiver as a factor, either perceived the data as 
highly sensitive and thus invasive regardless of who 
viewed it (Group 1) or very low in sensitivity and 
non-invasive whoever saw it (Group 3).  
3.2 Individual differences or social norms  
The study revealed different perceptions of the 
situation and relevant privacy implications.  
Although this divide may not represent a split prior to 
perceived privacy invasions, it could be concluded 
that the divisions are due to individual differences in 
privacy needs.  There have been arguments presented 
regarding the individual differences in privacy 
responses.  Underwood & Moore (1981) argued that 
some peoples’ behaviour varies according to the 
situation, whereas others’ does not.   Those with a 
high degree of “private self-consciousness”4 
carefully monitor their own behaviour (even when 
not being observed) and show consistent behaviour 
from situation to situation.   
There are arguments, however, that organisational 
culture and social control can be traded-off against 
users’ individual differences in privacy concerns 
                                                                                                                    
4 This relates to Schoeman’s (1992) idea of certain 
behaviours being mediated by social norms. 
(Dourish, 1993).  Bellotti & Sellen’s (1993) research 
identified that a reduction in users’ concern about 
privacy was related to a general environment of trust, 
and the development of acceptable practices 
governing the use of the application.  This brings to 
the forefront issues of trust, legitimate use and 
confidence in the information receivers.  Ultimately 
trust - or lack of it - in information receivers and 
information usage is an important variable amongst 
all users, which can determine the information 
sensitivity.   Our results show clear divisions in 
levels of trust in the technology.  Whilst Group 3 
expressed a high degree of trust (high usage benefits 
and no cost) in multicast conferencing, respondents 
in Groups 1 and 2 (68% of the respondents) 
expressed a lack of trust in the system (high usage 
costs).  A key factor for Groups 1 and 2 appears to be 
the perception of being observed in a private 
situation (the common room) – a violation of a social 
norm.  Group 3 in contrast perceived the common 
room to be a public situation with reduced social 
norms on observing people. This finding emphasises 
the importance of the perceived distinction between 
private and public, and the expected social norms in 
each situation, when defining information sensitivity 
(Schoeman, 1992).  It could be argued that Group 3’s 
perception of the common room as public is 
connected to their view of observing5 rather than 
being observed in this situation (Group 1 & 2’s 
assessment).  It is interesting that those who 
originally placed the camera (technical experts in 
network multimedia) showed Group 3 profiles in the 
email discussion.  A sense of being in control of the 
technology could therefore be linked to a distorted 
perception (from the majority) of the situation.  
These differences in perceptions may have already 
existed within the department. However, the 
technology introduction brought these differences to 
the fore, resulting in tension and an emotive debate 
which ended with a formal departmental decision to 
remove the technology.  This is a lesson for other 
organisations: to assess how the relationships 
between organisational control and trust will affect 
users’ privacy.  Trust is undermined if users are not 
allowed to judge trade-offs for themselves or feel 
part of the proposed solution.  Guidelines and 
boundaries (rather than restrictive controls) for use of 
the technology is required to encourage and nurture 
trust. 
3.3 Technologies distorting social norms 
To understand the power of ubiquitous multimedia 
applications, we must understand the social and 
5 These respondents also frequently used the common 
room and commented on this factor. 
psychological factors governing its use.  Most people 
are social creatures who are naturally interested in 
the world and people around them.  The key question 
is whether that interest is socially acceptable and 
where the dividing line between benign and intrusive 
lies. Being watched is not a problem per se – it 
depends on our awareness of how, when and by 
whom.  The type (e.g. camera angle), quality (e.g. 
resolution) and continuity (still images or continuous 
film) of video images can make them more or less 
invasive.  It is not only important to an individual 
that they are identifiable in certain situations, but also 
how they are perceived.  Filmmakers have used 
camera angles (close-ups, long shots) distorted 
quality (frosted lenses, lighting from below) and film 
continuity (stills, slow motion) for decades to aid 
film viewers in a crafted perception (as busy, 
slovenly, evil or good) of characters (Reeves & Nass, 
1996).  Thus, the individual’s need to control how 
others view them cannot be ignored.   Several 
respondents objected to the second situation (in the 
photocopy room) because the camera showed the hip 
portion only - producing a potentially comical or 
embarrassing image.   How we are viewed is also 
dependent on the situation in which we are observed.  
Harrison & Dourish (1996) pointed out the 
importance of our perception of place in social 
interactions.  We expect different behavior in private 
and public situations.  In this study we identified a 
division in the perceptions of the common room 
situation.   An individual’s failure to accurately 
identify a situation as private can have serious 
consequences.  To assess a technology-mediated 
situation accurately, users require adequate feedback 
and control mechanisms (Bellotti, 1997).  Users’ 
assessment of a situation depends on the degree of 
control they retain over how they are viewed and by 
whom.  Our study highlighted how the observer’s 
control of the technology distorted their perception of 
the place being observed.  To explain this complex 
phenomenon, consider the analogy of sitting in a café 
(semi-private) watching people in the street (public) - 
which is socially acceptable in most cultures. 
However, someone in the street (public) pulling up a 
chair and staring in at the diners of the café (semi-
private) would be perceived as unacceptable.  
Relating this analogy to this study, we can 
understand that the common room users perceived 
the situation as their café (semi-private) looking out 
on the street and corridor (public), able to see who 
can see them.  The common room observers, 
however, were sitting at their desk – equivalent to 
their café - (private) looking out on the common 
room (public), seeing people who cannot see them. 
The issue highlighted by this example is the 
perceived ownership and control of the “window”. 
We know and accept the risk of being watched and 
scrutinized as we walk in the streets (public).  
However, in more private situations (e.g. a café or 
changing room), our acceptance of being watched is 
reduced.  Ultimately, our behavior is guided by the 
situation.  If we misjudge the situation then we are at 
more of a risk of socially embarrassing ourselves. 
Assessing that situation is, therefore, of immense 
importance in our social interactions.  This may help 
to explain the emotive response that ensued from the 
camera installation: a perceived privacy invasion.  
The emotive response was caused by Group 1 & 2’s 
perceived lack of control over the situation, whereas 
Group 3 could not understand what all the fuss was 
about.  Emotive responses are produced as a defense 
mechanisms to a perceived threat, resulting from a 
lack of control over - potentially detrimental – 
representations of the self (Goffman, 1969;  
Schoeman, 1992).  Once users experience a lack of 
control and respond emotively, a total rejection of the 
application and all similar technology is the likely 
consequence.  In this study, those who felt the most 
discomfort subsequently rejected transmission of any 
audio and video data under any circumstances. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
In any social interaction, implicit assumptions are 
made to ensure the success of the interaction.  If 
those assumptions are incorrect, we are more likely 
to misjudge a situation and act inappropriately.  
Multimedia environments have the potential to 
distort the assumptions that guide our behavior 
(Reeves & Nass, 1996). The technology developers’ 
(who placed the camera) surprise at the emotive 
reactions to the perceived privacy invasion shows 
they had made inaccurate assumptions and 
misinterpreted the situation.  The key to their 
perception of the situation as public is their 
familiarity with the technology, and thus their sense 
of control over it.  This is probably why, even though 
Group 3 used the common room, they still retained 
an over-riding perception of the situation as an 
observer – they viewed the situation “through the 
camera’s eyes”.  The reasons for placing the camera, 
as detailed by the technology developers’ in an email, 
were primarily those of the observers, and not of 
those being observed.  The “security” motivation 
(catch those who take other people’s coffee) behind 
the camera placement, shows how the camera 
instigators dangerously crossed the line between 
multi-media environments and CCTV.  Crossing this 
line breaks many implicit assumptions underlying 
multimedia environments as a tool for increased co-
operation, communication and thus freedom of 
information.  Similarly, if CCTV broke the 
assumptions6 underlying their successful 
implementation, they would be in danger of 
producing an emotive backlash. The camera 
instigators also stated that the purpose for the 
technology was to increase telepresence and allow 
users to see what was going on in the common room.   
However, as the web-site was not initially advertised 
to the whole department, this again decreased a sense 
of control over the technology for those being 
observed, and produced an emotive rejection of it 
beyond the confines of the present situation.  This is 
an important finding for anyone introducing 
ubiquitous multimedia technology in an organization.  
Because of the degree of personal infringement 
experienced and the resulting emotive response, it is 
vital that the situation and implicit assumptions are 
judged accurately prior to installation.  Privacy 
problems need to be addressed before they arise - 
before users lose trust and become emotive. Once a 
problem becomes emotive it is far harder to solve.  
However, this danger arises from the organizational 
philosophy of ‘if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it’.  When it 
comes to ubiquitous multimedia technology and 
privacy – such an approach is likely to lead to 
rejection of the technology, and loss of trust in the 
organisation that introduced it.  Ultimately it is too 
dangerous to let those sleeping dogs lie.  
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